Frank Gannon's interview with Richard Nixon, May 27, 1983, part 3.

NIXON: --the Chinese having an old civilization, and I--Egypt goes back much older. It's one of the oldest civilizations in the world--two or three thousand years older in terms of history than even China. And as you look at the pyramids, you think of modern-day Egypt, a terribly, terribly poor country, overpopulated, but people with a great potential, a great potential. The--the Egyptians are the educators, or at least that's been my observation--the educators of the whole Mediterranean--southern Mediterranean-Mideastern area. And Sadat was trying desperately to move Egypt up economically. He died, unfortunately, before much progress had been made in that direction. But as we stood there in the pyramids, you naturally think of the past, and you think that 00:01:00a man like Sadat and those who follow him, like Mubarak--that they also must think of their past every time they look out their windows and see the pyramids and think of the greatness of Egypt in the past. That must renew their dedication and their determination to build a bigger and better Egypt in the future.

GANNON: Weve reached the end of our hour.

OFF SCREEN VOICE: Just stay for one second, gentlemen. Talk to each other. Lights.

GANNON: Do you remember that it was hot as hell and your leg hurt?

NIXON: Oh, yes. We'll get that in another place.

GANNON: Yeah.

NIXON: If you want the--

GANNON: Yes. No.

NIXON: --whole thing--

GANNON: No.

NIXON: I had the phlebitis in terms--

GANNON: No.

NIXON: --of another compact.

GANNON: I think for the--yes. I think for the fade-out on this, the f--picture of--the--the film of standing with the pyramids in the background and that--I think the way you did it is just right for ending the Sadat story. And we got 00:02:00the shah in. He was a little out of order, but we got him.

NIXON: That's right. That's enough.

GANNON: Got him in good.

NIXON: Well, the main thing is the line is "It's dangerous--"

OFF SCREEN VOICE: Thirty-five minutes.

NIXON: "It's dangerous to be a friend of the United States, and it pays to be an enemy." That summarizes it all.

OFF SCREEN VOICE: [Unintelligible, in background.]

NIXON: Be sure that stays in. You see, that's a k--

NIXON: --that's a kind of a quote that people can understand.

NIXON: Did you read this?

GANNON: Yes, we've got Middle Eastern food in honor of our--we--we have the sheep's eyes for you, Mr. President.

GANNON: --we ate for lunch there may be a--

OFF SCREEN VOICE: You better keep your eyes on me, Frank.

NIXON: Burp?

OFF SCREEN VOICE: I'm going to be counting down, and I'll cue you. [unintelligible]

NIXON: Is that--some burps, you mean?

GANNON: No, there may be a steady flow of people out to the--

NIXON: Can.

GANNON: --the head. [Both laugh.]

NIXON: [Coughs.]

OFF SCREEN VOICE: Stand by.

OFF SCREEN VOICE: Okay, ten seconds out.

GANNON: Over the years, you met King Faisal several times, both in Saudi Arabia and in the United States. What kind of a leader was he?

NIXON: I would have to rate him very, very high. Without question, he was the ablest leader of the Arab world that I've ever met, and I would rate him, in terms of all the leaders I've met, and I've met perhaps over three hundred heads of government and heads of state over the past thirty-seven years. I'd put him in the top ten. He's that good.

GANNON: Did he have a--a sophisticated understanding of the--the forces throughout the world or just in his region?

NIXON: That is--that was the reason that I would rate him so well. He was one who knew his country and knew it well. But he was one also who knew the world. He knew Europe, he knew America, he knew Asia. He could talk as well about other countries in other areas--s of the world as he did the Mideast. And he also had a deep appreciation of the East-West conflict. He had one hang-up, however, on 00:05:00which I--we did not agree. He always referred to the Zionist Communist conspiracy, e--even though the Soviet Union, it seemed to me, was trying to do Israel in, as he would have liked to have done it in, too, on occasion. But a--apart from that, he was a very clear thinker, and I--he played a great role, of course, when he helped to wean Sadat away from the Russians, one for which we should always be grateful to him.

GANNON: Did his belief in this Zionist-Communist conspiracy unbalance his judgment, do you think?

NIXON: Not to the point that, for example, he couldn't receive me. After the war of 1973, I had strongly supported Israel. We had saved Israel from defeat, certainly, or helped to save it, through the airlift and through keeping the Russians out. But he appreciated the fact, as he told me, that while he knew and understood that I was pro-Israel, that I was an American president that was not, 00:06:00because I was pro-Israel, anti-Arab. And all that he asked for was that the United States have an understanding of the Arab world, an appreciation. And that's why we developed a very good relationship. I would say, further, with regard to Faisal, he was two different men, as I remember him. I met him first when he was, I think, minister of finance in Prince--in King Saud's government, and he was in New York at the Waldorf-Asori--Astoria. I was in New York at the same time, and I found that he would like to get together for a meeting. And he was dressed in Western clothes and spoke impeccable English and so forth, and spoke about his concern about Mideast relations and so forth. Then when I saw him in 1974--he was king then, and he looked altogether different and sounded altogether different. He wore the hair--heavy Arab gowns that the men wear, the 00:07:00crown. He spoke only Arabic, never English. He was totally a man of the Saudi Arabian country empire at that time. He was a man, basically, who was two kinds and two different people in another sense. He was a progressive, progressive in terms that he wanted to move Saudi Arabia into the twentieth century, but, on the other hand, he was conservative, conservative in the best sense. He wanted to retain the best of the past. That's why he wanted to retain, basically, Saudi Arabian culture and religion. And it was a very intelligent thing to do, because, rather than making the mistake that some leaders in that area have made, of--of rooting out the past so that people don't have any roots in the past--keeping the best that is in the past and building on that, he avoided 00:08:00the--the re--rebellion that might have occurred by--i--if they thought they were being moved too fast into the modern.

GANNON: King Faisal had rather a--an unhappy, almost forbidding countenance. What was he like as a man?

NIXON: Well, a--again, it depends what period of time we're talking about. He's very different. When he was in his Western clothes in the Waldorf, he was basically a man of the West. And then, there in his own kingdom, he was as Arab as any Arab as I've ever seen. He was a man that seldom smiled. I remember one of his friends told me that whenever King Faisal smiled, it was like--as if someone had bitten into a lemon and found it to be sweet. He was also, incidentally--and this always impresses anybody who meets with somebody else--he was a very good listener. One of his favorite quotations was that God gave men 00:09:00two ears and one mouth, and the reason was that men were supposed to listen twice as much as they talked. But he not only used the proverb, he practiced it himself. And there's nothing that impresses the other fellow more than when you listen to what he has to say rather than insist that you've got to do the talking.

GANNON: Do you think that he intended the oil embargo during the 1973 war to have the revolutionary and revolutionizing effect on the West, and particularly on America and the American economy, that it did?

NIXON: I think that he must have had very mixed emotions about it. He felt he had no choice but to do that, in view of the fact that the--the United States had gone all-out in support of Israel against the Egyptians and against the Syrians, and, after all, Saudi Arabia a--Arabia at that time, and at the present time, supports those countries, as against Israel I think, however, that we 00:10:00have to give him credit for attempting to mitigate the effect of that embargo at a later time. In fact, Saudi Arabia and its oil minister, Yamani, were very, very helpful in getting the embargo removed eventually, but certainly moderated at a later time.

GANNON: How would you describe the effect of--both long-term and short-term, on the United States of the Arab oil embargo in 1973?

NIXON: Well, it was very detrimental in terms of the perception of--that Americans have of--of Saudi Arabia, the other oil-producing countries. After all, we don't like to sit in gas lines and have the price of gasoline go up and all--and go through all the things that we did during that embargo. And, of course, I was president at that time, and I've noted recently that they've got several billion ration tickets that they've ha--now got to destroy, because I 00:11:00wouldn't let rationing go ahead, thank God, when some were recommending it in the administration. But, nevertheless, that perception of the Saudi Arabians as being basically anti-American, which was really not it so much as they--they're anti-Israeli--and I think Saudi Arabia, we have to recognize, too, had another problem. Saudi Arabia is not a very populous country. It's a very big country, and it's a very rich country, but almost half its population is Palestinian, and so, under the circumstances, I think Faisal felt that the embargo had to go forward or the Palestinians would've been in an uproar.

GANNON: Do you think that the results of the oil embargo contributed to your downfall a year later?

NIXON: Well, a number of things contributed to it. It didn't help. In fact, the fact that the recession began to develop--the oil embargo, of course, created more inflation, and that, combined with the worldwide food shortage in 1973, 00:12:001974, helped to create the inflation which later led to the recession. So, it contributed to it, probably.

GANNON: You met King Faisal when you were in the Mideast on your tour in 1974. Did you talk to him about the possibility that you might not survive in office in terms of what would happen with American policy in the Middle East, or did he raise it?

NIXON: [Clears throat.] No, he didn't raise that. That just left--he just left that unsaid. I was consequently very surprised when we met the press after our formal talks, and he stepped right up to that issue in a way that left little to the imagination. He first praised me quite fulsomely, and perhaps more than he should have, in terms of what my policies had done toward producing peace in the 00:13:00world, "peace and progress," as he called it. And he said, "I urge all Americans and all people in other countries to support President Nixon in the greatest initiative toward peace in world history--one of the greatest, certainly." And then he went on to say, "And those in America and those in other parts of the world who oppose him are, in effect, opposing the cause of peace." And he concluded it by saying--and he said, "Mr. President, so hand-in-hand and shoulder-to-shoulder, we will go forward together in working for a world in which there will b--pea--there--there will be peace and progress and justice." Well, it had quite an impact on the press corps, because by that time I think many of them, understandably, not only were against me, but they w--were hoping that everybody else would be as well and were waiting for the day--for the 00:14:00downfall. But it didn't help him. The point is that, as far as Faisal was concerned, he could have buttered up to the press by saying nothing or even, still, giving a little jab in terms of my problem being my own and being rather harmful to relations. But his standing up the way he did was just the kind of a man he was.

GANNON: The--the House of Saud seems to enjoy special prestige and success. What do you think it is that sets it apart from the other ruling houses or the other rulers in the Middle East?

NIXON: Well, one thing that sets it apart is that they're very rich. They're the richest country in the Mideast. But it's more than that. Basically, Saudi Arabia is the religious center of the Mideast, and also, in looking at Faisal, and in looking also at his predecessors, Khalid and Saud--whatever we want to say about them, they were deeply and profoundly religious men. The same, of 00:15:00course, is true of Fahd, who is now king, and a man also whom I knew very well and very favorably--met him in Washington first when he was not even crown prince, just a minister, and then met him later when he was crown prince, and have been in correspondence with him since he has ascended the throne. That's part of the reason. The other reason is that the Saudis have played, because of their wealth, a--a very significant role with other countries. After all, they subsidize, or did subsidize, the Egyptians. That's one of the reasons Faisal had great influence with Sadat. But they subsidize the other Arab g--governments to a very substantial amount and therefore can influence them. Now, I must say there are those, and understandably, in this country and other parts of the world who think that the Saudis are much too cautious, that they'll never step 00:16:00up to anything. But I would only suggest th--that the reason they are that way i--is that--that whoever is king in Saudi Arabia is sitting on, basically, a--a potential explosive situation, due to the fact that there's such a heavy proportion of the population which is Palestinian and potentially ra--radical. But above all, I think the reason that the present House of Saud has prestige far beyond the population of the country is not so much its money but because, while it supports progress for the future, it has not made the mistake of rooting out the past, and therefore its progress is going to b--be built on the solid culture that the Saudis think is very important to them and to the other countries in the Arab world.

GANNON: How would you describe the American stake in Saudi Arabia?

NIXON: Well, the stake, of course, is enormous, due to the fact that Saudi Arabia has not only present oil but also great reserves in oil which are among the greatest in the world. Now, that is important to us, but it is indispensable to Japan and indispensable to most of Europe, except for the British, of course, who now have North Sea oil. At the time, for example, o--of--of the embargo--one of the reasons in 1973--one of the reasons that our European friends didn't want to go along on that, and, of course, didn't, is they were mortally afraid of the effect that an embargo would have on them. Now, the United States, if an embargo were to come--if, for example, Saudi Arabia and the other oil-producing states 00:18:00in the Persian Gulf were cut off from us, if that supply were cut off, we could get along. It'd be tough, but we could. Japan could not, and much of Western Europe could not. So, therefore, Saudi Arabia holds the oil pipeline which is essential for the manufacturing capabilities of much of Europe and of Japan and, to an extent, of the United States.

GANNON: Are there circumstances in which America's--America would go and fight to protect that pipeline if it were threatened?

NIXON: Well, I think one of the reasons that after the Afghan invasion by the Soviet Union, President Carter announced the doctrine for that part of the world, that the United States would be prepared to intervene, and asked for ap--approval by the Congress, and approval was given, for a force which would be 00:19:00available in the area to handle such contingencies. I would say that certainly the United States is developing that kind of capability. Now, when the question is asked as to whether or not we would go to war in order to save our oil pipeline, I think that poses a very difficult one. I'm not prepared to say what others would do. I certainly would suggest that our European friends, the Japanese, and the United States would have such an enormous stake there, that we could not stand by and allow that whole area to come under control of a power that would be antigonist--antagonistic to us.

GANNON: When you were president, would you have sent in troops if--if that were 00:20:00the case--if it were threatened, say, by the Soviets?

NIXON: [Clears throat.] They would certainly think so. Th--they're nor--it isn't a question of whether--whether people thought that I would, but as far as the Soviet were concerned, they weren't about to make a move of that sort, particularly after what I had done in Vietnam. I had proved my credibility by taking the risks we did politically in the invasion of Cambodia, as it is--as it was called, the May eighth bombing and mining of Haiphong, the bombing in December of 1972. All of these things create credibility, and I do not think that the Soviet Union would have tried to test me in that way. But there was another reason, too. We have to recall that with all of the problems of so-called "dtente," that--that the very fact that summit meetings were going on an annual basis deterred the Soviet Union from engaging in aggressive conduct 00:21:00in that part of the world or any other part of the world that might be detrimental to the interest between the two countries.

GANNON: Do you remember how you heard about the assassination of King Faisal?

NIXON: Oh, yes, I read it in a news report. It didn't--which was--which had come in in the morning. That was all. I--

GANNON: You've written in your book that he was perhaps the--the only modern leader assassinated by or because of television. What did you mean by that?

NIXON: Well, the irony in Faisal's case was, as I have often pointed out, he was a progressive--progressive in the sense that he had a great program for literacy, he abolished slavery, he provided education for women, and of course a great program--because they had the funds for it--to build hospitals and roads and schools and all that sort of thing. He moved this basically nomadic desert 00:22:00empire into the position of being a modern state. On the other hand, deep down, he was a conservative, and deep down--and he has told me this in our conversations--he didn't like television. He thought it was a corrupting influence. But also, as a pragmatist, he realized that many of the younger people in Saudi Arabia did like it, but also he realized that if Saudi Arabia were going to be a modern state, it had to go forward with some of these modern appliances. And what happened was--the irony of it all--was that he, one who opposed television, was assassinated by an extremist who was opposed to having any television in Saudi Arabia. So he is the first, and I hope the last, leader who has lost his life because of television, having in mind the fact that it shouldn't have happened to him. Let me say, incidentally, that brings up another very important point to make which many people miss. When people think of 00:23:00Faisal, and when they think of Sadat, and they think of the shah and those who opposed them, most liberals jump to the conclusion that they--that the shah was forced out of power and that Faisal was assassinated and Sadat was assassinated because they may have been too conservative. It's just the other way around. In all cases, in the case of the shah, it was not the liberals who drove him from power, it were [sic] those who wanted to turn the clock back. In the case of Faisal, it was a conservative reactionary who assassinated him, and the c--same was--case of Sadat. I remember Faisal--even he did not see the danger--that the real danger was not on the left, but on the right. I recall he expressed great concern to me when I was there about his own air force. He said that many of his young air force pilots had been trained in the United States, and he had sensed 00:24:00that many of them had come back inoculated, as he thought, with the virus of Western liberalism, and he f--feared that therefore they might engage in, frankly, revolutionary activities. It didn't work out that way. He lost his life not because the left opposed him, but because the right did, even though he was more on the right than he was on the left. And I think throughout that part of the world, we should make another observation. We can speak of the danger of Communism in that part of the world, and it is not to be, certainly, underestimated, because the Communists will always come to power, and they'll always profit from chaos, and there's a lot of chaos out there, and they'll do what they can to m--pick up the small change even, in the way that they usually do. But, on the other hand, if there were no Communism, if Russia didn't even exist and was not trying to move into that part of the world, there would still 00:25:00be a major problem. The problem is on the right. In Morocco, in Tunisia, in Jordan, in Egypt, in Saudi Arabia, you will find that, as far as the opposition forces to those governments, all of which are so-called, quote, "moderate" governments--the opposition forces are forces that are on the right, like the revolution in Iran. As a matter of fact, I would say the most destabilizing potential force in the Mideast today is not Soviet-supported activities, but the kind of attitudes and activities and so forth that are represented by Khomeini in Iran a--and by Qaddafi in Syria. I mean, b--b--by Qaddafi in Libya.

GANNON: How do you think history will assess King Faisal's role and contribution?

NIXON: Oh, far better than his contemporaries. It has to assess him well, because he was a big man. I mean, a--and there were--and, incidentally, I am not alone in this appraisal. Many other leaders have told me--they don't publicly, as I do--but they had enormous respect for Faisal. I--I'll put it this way. He's one of the few men in the world it was worth traveling eight thousand miles to see. He's just worth talking to, because he was so intelligent and had the wisdom that he did, but I think they will--they will app--un--they will appreciate him in this respect--that he recognized in that part of the world, which is so backward, which needs progress, he recognized the need for progress and supported it--for--for liberating women, for moving ahead on the literacy problem, for moving ahead in all the areas of industrialization and so forth. But he also recognized that in building the new future, you must also retain the 00:27:00best of the past.

GANNON: On your June 1974 trip to the Middle East, you went for the first time to Syria, a country that you hadn't visited before. What were your first impressions of your first visit to Syria?

NIXON: Well, a lot different than the background that I had received with regard to what Syria might be like. I don't mean the briefing papers said this, but much of what I had read in the press and some people who had been there observed it--they always refer to "the crazy Syrians," and that this fellow Assad was a bit of a nut, totally irrational, you couldn't do anything with him, and so forth, and that--another thing that was said was that there was no country in the world which was more anti-American than Syria. And so, consequently, when the trip was laid on and we went to Syria after being in Saudi Arabia, I was a little concerned about the kind of reception we would get. 00:28:00And I remember sitting in the cabin of the plane, making some notes for the arrival, and all of a sudden the plane really gave a lurch, and I thought we'd hit an air pocket, and the pilot came back and he said, "There's some S--Soviet jets outs--out there." And I looked, and, sure enough, they were buzzing the plane. Well, we were relieved when we found out that, while they were Soviet jess--jets, they were operated by Syrian pilots, and that they were simply an escort to escort us into the airport. So, we arrived there in Damascus, and I must say it was one of the most fascinating places I've ever visited. I had not known until this trip that Damascus is the oldest continually populated city in the world. I'd known it from this description in the Bible. I had not known that it went back that far. And I must say, apart--as contrasted to the anti-Americanism that was expected, or I expected, they were very pro-American. 00:29:00The people would clap when we came out of meetings. They lined the streets, although there wasn't a great deal of publicity about our being there and so forth. I think, however, it posed quite a problem to Assad, because I remember he told me after he had witnessed--after we had ridden in from the airport and saw all these people on the side there, he--he said, "I hope you noted the warm welcome you received." And I said I did. He said, "Well, it does pose a problem, see." And then he told me what had happened when he had talked to his eighteen--eight-year-old son just after we came in, and his eight-year-old son had seen me shaking hands with Assad at the airport. He said, "Father," he said, "how possibly could you do that?" He said, "Isn't Nix--that Nixon, the Zionist, you were shaking hands with? That evil man who sided with Israel against us in the Jordan war in 1970, the man who saved Israel with the airlift in 1973? How 00:30:00could you possibly shake hands with him?" And Assad went on to say, he said, "You've got to understand, even though he's only eight, that as far as our children in this country--they have been taught to hate capitalism. They have been taught to hate America, and particularly they've been taught to hate Nixon, because Nixon is the one that sided with Israel and also helped Israel in 1973 and avoided a defeat that we otherwise would have inflicted upon them. And then he said, "I replied to my son with one of our favorite proverbs. 'Better for the blind man to see with one eye than not to see at all.'" Now the question is, why would Sada--why would Assad, after all of this propaganda, anti-American propaganda--why would he want to tilt his policy a bit more our way? And I think that the reason is that, deep down, Assad and the Syrians are not pro-Russian. 00:31:00They like the Americans a lot better. They'd like to have a foot in our camp as well. They depend upon the Russians, but that is the reason that he, I think, was glad to see us there, and he welcomed the opportunity to agree, as we did agree, to a resumption of relations and particularly to economic cooperation, which unfortunately has aborted considerably since we left.

GANNON: One of the other leaders in that region that you have known for many years, from his time as a very young man, is King Hussein. What are your impressions, or what do you remember from your various meetings with King Hussein?

NIXON: Before getting to that, it's another interesting thing to note that in both Egypt and Syria we had a very interesting reaction in terms of the difference between the Russians and the Americans. And I got this report from Manolo Sanchez, who worked for us and who accompanied me on the trip. And 00:32:00Sanchez would go into the kitchens and check the food and that sort of thing and talk to some of the people, and the waiters and so forth, and cooks. And he said that in Syria--said when he went in there, they said, "Thank God the Americans here [sic]. Now we hope the Russians go." And he--he said they didn't like the Russians, because the Russians were--lived apart, and they were sour and mean. And when we got there to Egypt, he ran into exactly the same thing, and Assad told us that the Americans made more friends in six months, because we had renewed relations, of course, in 1973, after the '73 war, than the Russians had made in six years. And I think what it had to do with was the way Americans conduct themselves abroad. Whether rightly or wrongly, we are a very friendly people. W--we're a very outgoing people, and the Russians were dour, under their Communist rules and so forth. They weren't allowed to fraternize. And so we have something going for us in that respect. But with regard to Hussein, he has been 00:33:00described as a survivor, and he certainly is. I've known him for twenty-five years. He came to the Eisenhower White House, and then I have known him off and on through the years, both there and in--in his own country. And he is a man, first, of great intelligence. He's very shrewd in--politically, but he is a man who is sitting on a powder keg, because, again, about half of his people are Palestinian or Palestinian background. And, in fact, as far as the Jordanians are concerned, if he is to survive as king, he's got to get along with both. And that is why he has to be more cautious than some in the West would like him to be. They want him to step up there and run over to Jerusalem right away. Well, 00:34:00if he does that right away without getting some sort of better understanding with regard to relations in the future and as far as the West Bank is concerned, he's going to risk physical or political suicide or both. Another thing about him that many are not aware of in the West is that he's an enormously courageous man. I'm referring to it not politically primarily, but particularly physically. For example, in 1970, when there was--were very serious problems within Jordan--groups rebelling, particularly Palestinian types--he led the lead tank himself and operated it. H--he is absolutely fearless. And when his critics say that he isn't fearless enough in making some sort of agreement with Israel and stepping forth, I would say better to have him there as a moderate leader, which he is, as one who is not anti-Israel--and that's true of him as well--than to 00:35:00have him out of there and have a radical Palestinian in charge in Jordan. Let's don't push him to take action until he gets something from Israel that will be understood by his own people.

GANNON: How would you describe King Hassan?

NIXON: Hassan of--of Morocco is--is quite an outstanding leader in his own right as well. Let's first understand that Morocco is a very important country. It isn't recognized as being important as it is, not simply because it is basically a Moslem or Arab country, which it is. Because of its location, Morocco is one of the most strategically important countries in the world. It borders on the Straits of Gibraltar. It is the bridge between Africa and Europe. 00:36:00It is also a bridge between the Arab world and the rest of--of Africa and the Arab world and the Mideast. And so, under the circumstances, it's a very important country. Now, coming to him himself, I met him for the first time in 1957. I was a--a young vice-president then, travelling in that area, and he was a very young crown prince. And his father, who was then the sultan--later became Muhammad V, the king of Morocco--had his crown prince a--accompany me as we drove through the streets of Casablanca and Rabat and these other cities. There were thousands and thousands of people out. I followed my usual practice in my vi--that I had in my vice-presidential days of stopping the car from time to time and moving into the crowds and shaking hands and going into the bazaars and the coffee shops. Now many times when I did that when I was in other countries, 00:37:00the people just didn't understand it--I mean, the people I was traveling with. But not him. He loved doing it himself. He mingled with the people, and he still does, now that he is king. Another thing happened on that trip that was very interesting. It rained for the first time in a year, and they'd had a terrible drought. And that night the king of Morocco, King Hassan--I mean, Muhammad V, the father of the present king, proposed a toast to me. And he said, "To the man with the green feet. That means wherever he walks, the grass grows." And I understand that's th--about the best toast you can get. The other point of interest insofar as the background is concerned is that when his father, Muhammad V, came to the United States in 1957 for his state visit, that was the only occasion in eight years that I ever was the host at a White House dinner. And that was because that was the day that President Eisenhower had his stroke. So that night I was the host of the dinner, along with Mrs. Eisenhower. Now that 00:38:00King Hassan has grown up--he's no longer a young prince, he is now a mature king--I would evaluate him this way--highly intelligent, but I think one of the most impressive things about him is that he has a better understanding of Europe and European politics than any Arab leader that I have met, with the possible exception of Faisal. Faisal would be about equal. He's very sophisticated. He travels a lot in Europe, and he handles the situation within his own country, I think, quite well. He has the polisarios who are rebelling against him, but instead of going out and fighting them in their turf out in the deserts, he's taken the best part of the disputed Spanish Sahara. He's built a wall around it and stays behind the wall. It's one of the few walls in history that has worked.

GANNON: How would you describe President Bourguiba?

NIXON: Bourguiba is one of the real survivors in the area. He's been in power as long as anybody can remember. Very charismatic, very outspoken, very warm and friendly. He's--he--when I visited him last, in 1982, he threw his arms around me he was so glad to see me, because I had seen him also in 1957. And he is very courageous in terms of Arab-Israel relations. He is one of the first of the Arab leaders who began to make moves toward a more moderate stance toward Israel. And he's done that, even though--even in--even though in his country, in Tunis, they have a problem as far as the radical right is concerned. Bourguiba in Tunis has the radical right. They are his danger. His danger is not on the left. Hassan's danger is on the right, not the left. This is interesting to say about Hassan. 00:40:00Hassan has been thought of as a very rich--is--which he is--monarch, living very well, which he does, and you would think that therefore his danger would be on the liberals, on the left. But his danger is not there because he is progressive in terms of trying to move the country into the modern era. His danger is on the right--those who want to move Morocco back as, for example, Khomeini has moved Iran back. And it's to our interest, above everything else, to be--do everything we can to see that leaders like Hassan, and like Bourghiba, and like the king of Jordan, and, of course, the Saudis--that they have as much support as we possibly can, so that moving our way will demonstrate to the peoples of those countries that that's a better way than moving back, as Khomeini has moved the Iranians.

GANNON: If these Arab leaders are so great and so important and influential, 00:41:00why is it that they are either unknown to most Americans or that they are thought of as sort of grown men wearing bed sheets?

NIXON: A part of it is at their own fault. They have been very inept in terms of their public relations. They--they don't--they have not demonstrated the understanding of the United States, and particularly our media, that they should. They come over here and hi--hire high-priced PR firms who--who don't understand it either and just take their money and pocket it, and--and, I f--feel, in many cases don't do much good for them, although there are some exceptions, of course. Another reason f--we have to be very candid about it--is that this country is basically very supportive of Israel, and it is generally assumed that Arab leaders are opposed to Israel. Now, that's not true of the king of Morocco, despite some of the impressions that fray--it's not true of 00:42:00Bourguiba. It's not true of the king of Jordan. It is true, certainly, of the Saudis. They are very strongly anti-Israel. But, on the other hand, the fact that--that so many Americans have been indoctrinated--the idea that to be pro-Arab means that you're anti-Israel I think causes some of the problem. And that's simply got to change, because these are a--men that--that--that deserve certainly a--a better hearing insofar as the United States are concerned. I'd say further that one impression that I made in my toast in Saudi Arabia, and I followed this same theme in the toasts in the other countries that I visited on that trip in 1974 and again when I went back last year--I constantly made the point that I was pro-Israel. I mean I didn't duck that because they all know that. But I made the point that being pro-Israel doesn't mean that you're anti-Arab. And then I made this point, and this, I think, touched them. I said, 00:43:00"It is not natural for Americans and Arabs to be enemies. It is natural for us to be friends." They appreciate that, and I believe that. And I think that if we can just get that across and then if we can some way take some of the poison out of the Israeli-Arab antagonism by finding some even halfway solution for the West Bank, providing some kind of self-government, defusing that issue so that it can't be exploited by the radicals on the right or by the Soviet Union--that that is going to change the whole Arab world in terms of its perception in the United States.

GANNON: Do you think that if the Arabs had better or most sophisticated public relations that American support for Israel might be changed or attenuated?

NIXON: I'm not very high--I never have been--on public relations moves. Public relations firms--I--I know they're necessary. I think sometimes they're a necessary evil, and some of my very good friends operate them. But generally speaking, as far as that particular matter is concerned, it's essential for these countries themselves and their leaders to understand America. The most effective proponent of any of these countries in the United States is the man himself as they perceive him. He is the one who can best present a proper image in America. I--I'm just sorry, for example, that Faisal has passed from the scene. If he had been able to come to the United States, as he would have if he had lived, and certainly if I had survived he'd have been there very fast--but if he'd have been able to come to the United States, with his sophistication, with his wisdom, and so forth, he, with one visit, could have substantially 00:45:00altered the perception of the Amer--of the Western world, particularly of the United States. And let's get another example of that--Sadat. Now, one of the reasons that Sadat, who was the only leader of that part of the world, except for Israelis, many of whom have been in the top ten--the only reason he has been in the top ten of those most admired in the world among Americans who answered the poll--the reason was, first, that he had gone to Jerusalem and therefore he was not considered to be anti-Israel. But second because of his personality. People are able to see him. He's a charismatic figure. And, consequently, I--I think it's--it's very important for some of these leaders to be exposed to the American public but to be exposed under circumstances where they can present their own case. Hussein does a good job in that respect, incidentally--handles himself well with--part--part of the reason being, of course, that he speaks 00:46:00English. But time will--it takes some time to work this out. But we've got to defuse the Palestinian-Israeli thing before there's going to be widespread acceptance of these Arab leaders for what they really are--that they aren't just a bunch of nuts wearing bed sheets and so forth and so on. They are different from us, a--and we should not try to change their cultures or their religions. They like theirs and we like ours, but, on the other hand, we've got to recognize they go their way, we go ours, and, as I've often said, it's not natural for Americans and Arabs to be enemies. Let us be friends.

GANNON: What's your opinion of Yasir Arafat?

NIXON: I do not know him, except from what I've seen on television, and what I read in the newspapers, but I think I could best describe him as being a cat on a hot tin roof. He's jumping all over the place, and the reason is that he sits 00:47:00on what is called the P.L.O. There are various segments of that. Now, many people have painted him as being a moderate among the Palestinians. Deep down, perhaps he wants to be, and deep down he knows that's the best way to get some kind of acceptance by Israel of some kind of self-government on the West Bank. But, on the other hand, he cannot cut the umbilical cord with what he's called his hard core, the Al Fatah group, a--and the moment that he, for example, made any kind of conciliatory statements with regard to Hussein being allowed to join the talks on the Reagan plan for the West Bank, the al-Fatah group raised hell with him, and he had to back off, because their only answer is to wage war. Now, he's obviously an intelligent man. He knows that waging war has not worked for 00:48:00them as was--any time, and it certainly didn't work the last time when the Israelis wiped them out in Lebanon. But while he is ac--I would say, a cat, then, on a hot tin roof, he also is a cat with nine lives, because how he's able to survive out there in that hotbed of intrigue and differences and so forth--it's hard to say.

GANNON: Do you think the Israelis lost moral stature by the invasion of Lebanon and the Beirut massacre?

NIXON: Before going into that, I think it's important to--to really tackle a subject that's often raised. I mean, you say, "Why don't we talk to Arafat? Why don't we talk to the P.L.O.?" And the answer is we can't. We can't because, like it or not, we have cast our lot with and for Israel, and their not recognizing Israel means they're not recognizing us. And so, therefore, unless--till they do 00:49:00that, it would be a mortal affront to I--I--Isr--Israel for us to deal with the P.L.O. However, there is another ground. We should try to influence them, and I say "we" in the broadest sense of the word. We should not object to our European friends and our friends in the Ara--ma--on the Arab world [sic], particularly the Saudis, talking to Arafat. In fact, we should encourage it, having in mind the fact that maybe over a period of time he and the Palestinians can be moved away from the totally intransigent line that they have at the present time. Now to your other question.

GANNON: Do you think that the Israelis lost moral stature, or how much moral stature did they lose by the invasion of Lebanon and the massacre in Beirut?

NIXON: Immediately after the massacre, it seemed like it had been almost a death blow, but since then, as it's gotten to more perspective, and since then, 00:50:00when the Israelis faced up to the problem and had a very extensive inquiry which resulted in the defense minister, Sharon, having to resign his post--and being appointed to another one, of course--I think that that has tended to mitigate the strong feeling in the West, and particularly in the United States, that they had lost moral stature, that they were as bad as their enemies, in effect, by--by condoning, or seeming to condone, or allowing to happen, the terrible massacre that occurred, a--even though it could be excused--maybe not excused but certainly understood, having in mind the fact that millions of Jews were massacred in Germany, oh, and in Poland, and in Europe, and so forth and so on. One massacre doesn't make--which is wrong doesn't make another one right, and they know that. I think what has happened here is that among many of Israel's younger people, as well as some of the thoughtful older ones, there is a 00:51:00feeling, a--deep-set feelings, that this policy of continuing war in the long run is going to be disastrous to what I--Israel wants to be, what it means to itself and what it means to the world--that if Israel is going to continue to have to fight its neighbors, then war inevitably leads to repression. War basically i--is a brutal, brutal business. It results in killings, and--and when you let that beast out, sometimes massacres occur, just as they did with us, with My Lai, although we of course reprimanded and prosecuted those who were engaged in it. Let me put it--let me describe it this way. The massacre there was not something that the Israelis approved, but they might have avoided it. But it isn't like the situation with the--with the North Vietnamese in Vietnam. 00:52:00There the killing of civilians, assassination, murder, rape, everything--that was a matter of policy. This was not a matter of policy. This was opposed to Israeli policy, and that's a big difference. So I'd say that, as far as this is concerned, this has set a lot of Israelis to thinking about the future of their country, as it should, and, in my view, we're going to have more things like that in the future, because it is one of the fallouts from war--are events of this sort. And so, therefore, we have to take some risks for peace rather than just continuing to be involved in war.

GANNON: Did you ever have second thoughts or doubts or concerns about the effectiveness of Henry Kissinger, a Jewish secretary of State, formulating Mideast policy for your administration?

NIXON: Well, there are many who thought it was a great mistake at the time he was appointed. But I had great confidence in Henry Kissinger, because I knew that he was fair-minded. I knew, too, that while there was no question about his being devoted to the survival of Is--of Israel--that--that he thought in geopolitical terms and that he felt it was very important to support my policy, which has been mine throughout my li--my public life--my policy, which is we stand for Israel, we will support Israel, but that does not mean that we will not also seek better relations with the Arab s--states. And Henry carried that out extremely well. For example, on his shuttle trips, we--we developed closer relations with Egypt, even to a certain extent with Syria, a--and with some of 00:54:00the other countries. Now, I must say there are some out there who don't trust him because he is Jewish. I think, however, they're mistaken in that respect.

GANNON: A--aren't there also some who don't trust him because they feel he said different things to different people in the different countries?

NIXON: That is correct. I have heard that, and maybe that's just one of the costs of being a diplomat.

GANNON: Why is that the U.S. State Department is considered to be pro-Arab and throughout your administration thwarted in some cases, directly or indirectly, some of your pro-Israeli Middle Eastern initiatives? Wouldn't one expect the foreign policy establishment, as represented in the State Department, to be pro-Israeli?

NIXON: Well, first of all, the State Department is not just one entity. It's--the--the State Department is made up of individual Foreign Service Officers, and there're some over there that are very pro-Israeli. The majority 00:55:00of them, as are the great majority of those in the Pentagon, however, are pro-Arab as well, and I emphasize that point. The--the State Department people, and I think the Pentagon people, too, are not pro-Arab and therefore anti-Israeli, but they feel it is very important that the U--that for geopolitical reasons that the United States not alienate a hundred million Arabs, particularly when they sit on as much of the strategic oil of the world as they do. And even apart from that, if there were no oil there at all, that's a lot of people, and they cover a lot of important territory--the gateway to Africa, the gateway to the Indian Ocean, et cetera. And so, I think, too, in--in--in defense of some of the State Department people, who may be called the Arabists--we have to have in mind they believe, as I believe, that it is vitally 00:56:00important from Israel's standpoint that the United States have good relations with Israel's neighbors rather than bad relations, because we will restrain their neighbors. The Soviet Union, if we leave a vacuum, would not. It would egg them on. So that's the way I would look at it.

GANNON: Can--do you think that there can ever be a truly bipartisan American Mideastern policy, given the--

OFF SCREEN VOICE: Excuse me, Frank. We want to do a pickup on that question. You hit your microphone, and it made a sound. [unintelligible]

GANNON: 'Kay.

OFF SCREEN VOICE: Switch two on the line, and--I'm sorry, switch one on the line. Okay, go ahead.

NIXON: Well, generally speaking, Democratic candidates will get a very heavy 00:57:00majority of the Jewish vote. Republican candidates simply don't. Eisenhower's highest percentage of the Jewish vote was about 38 percent in 1956. My highest percenta--

THE FOLLOWING IS IN THE ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT BUT NOT ON A TAPE

NIXON: [percenta]ge of the Jewish vote was 32 percent in 1972, at a time I got about 68 percent of the non-Jewish vote in the country. President Reagan got about 36--35, 36 percent in his landslide in 1980. He wont get that much the next time around, due to the fact that people probably feel that a Democratic candiate will be more pro-Israeli than Reagan, although Reagan is, as I have pointed out to many of our friends in the Jewish community--is the most, in my view--the most pro-Israeli president in the White House, deep down in this heart, since Harry Truman. Not that Eisenhower wasn't--

GANNON: How about since you?

NIXON: In my case, I was, but, on the other hand, in my case--